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ABSTRACT  
Between 1987 and 1996 Chinese exports increased by an average of 14% 
each year. During this decade, export growth became a crucial determinant 
of overall economic growth. However, as a consequence of the East Asian 
financial crises, Chinese export growth slowed, threatening the successful 
implementation of plans to restructure the domestic Chinese economy. This 
paper traces the reasons for the rapid growth and subsequent slowing of 
Chinese exports, and asks whether the strategy provides a solid basis for the 
long term development of the Chinese economy. In particular, the paper 
focuses on the role and significance of the processing trade in boosting 
Chinese exports. The high proportion of imported components in processed 
exports questions whether China is really benefiting as much from export 
growth as aggregate trade figures seem to suggest. 
 
When China embarked on a process of economic reform in 1978, it was 
rare to find Chinese-made goods on sale in the West. China was not a major 
trading nation, and what it did trade was overwhelmingly in primary 
produce with other developing nations. Twenty years later Chinese 
trade had increased by almost 500%, the developed world now 
predominated in Chinese trade, and manufactured goods accounted 
for almost 90% of China’s exports to OECD countries—the `Made 
in China’ stamp is now common throughout the world. 
 
While not denying that export growth has clearly contributed to the growth 
of the Chinese economy as a whole, this paper offers a critical examination 
of the benefits of pursuing an export-led growth strategy. This investigation 
is divided into two main levels of analysis. First, rather than taking a 
national approach and asking if and how China has benefited from a growth 
in trade, the paper disaggregates Chinese export figures and asks who is 
benefiting most from the growth of Chinese trade? On one level, we see 
strong regional disparities in export performance. On another, we need to 
question whether exports from China can be meaningfully described as 
being `Chinese’. The large growth in Chinese trade is in no small part a 
result of the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade, 
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and China’s position in an international chain of production. Indeed, we 
should question whether nationally based trade statistics reveal very much 
about the dynamics of international trade and the `nationality’ of trade. 
 
Second, the Chinese experience illuminates how a dependence on 
export-led growth can create asymmetrical dependence on external 
economic actors. This issue becomes particularly pertinent when domestic 
growth is slow - as was the case in China in 1989, and again after 
1997. An analysis of China’s export performance in the 1990s 
shows both how China at least contributed to the economic 
difficulties of other export-orientated states in East Asia, and also 
how the financial crises place question marks over the long-term 
wisdom of China’s own export growth strategy. 
 
Tracing the growth in Chinese exports 
There is a tendency to describe China in the Maoist  period as 
a `closed economy’. This popular perception rather exaggerates the level 
of isolation, and is primarily a product of equating the capitalist 
world with the international economy. As Zhang has 
demonstrated, while China did look to self-reliance where 
possible in economic development, foreign trade also played a role 
`as a balancing sector of the Chinese economy’.1 Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that trade increased after 1949, it is fair to say that China was 
not a significant player in the global economy during the Maoist 
era. After China’s break from the Soviet Union and the gradual 
and moderate programme of re-engagement with the West in the 
1970s, trade did increase, but trade volumes remained relatively 
low. Total Chinese trade was a meagre US$4.8 billion in 1971, 
and even after an almost five-fold expansion in trade, still only totalled 
$20.6 billion in 1978.2 
 
But 1978 marked a watershed in Chinese economic policy.  
The init ial  moderate reforms initiated in 1978 gave only a strictly limited 
role for international economic interaction, and China’s re-integration into 
the global economy was initially a slow and gradual affair. While 
rather modest compared with later changes, the adoption of a 
more open policy towards the global economy in 1978 marked a 
fundamental ideological shift that was a prerequisite for all that 
was to follow. Even remembering that Chinese trade has grown 
from a very low starting point, the growth in Chinese trade since 
1978 has been spectacular. As the Director General  of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), Renato Ruggiero, put it in 
a speech at Beijing University in April 1997: 
There is a simple reality which lies at the heart of our 
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current negotiations and the real challenges of adjustment 
we all face: the reality that China is already a leading power 
in an ever more interdependent global economy. This reality 
is emphasised by the sheer force of China’s rise in the 
world. During the last decade, output has been expanding 
by an average of 10 per cent a year, while merchandising 
export volume has been growing even faster, at about 15 per 
cent. In two decades the value of China’s merchandise 
exports has expanded more than twenty-fold.3 
 
Methodological and statistical problems 
Before providing more details of this expansion in exports, it is important to 
provide a caveat on the problems of calculating Chinese trade, and its 
importance for overall economic growth. There are two main 
areas of dispute here. First, there is the question of the size of the 
Chinese economy. Chinese figures from the State Statistical Bureau 
used in all official Chinese reports calculated Chinese GDP in 1997 as 
RMB 7.48 trillion, which roughly equates to US$900 billion. 
However, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) calculations produce a much 
higher figure. For example, the CIA World Factbook calculates Chinese 
GDP in 1997 at $4.25 trillion.4 Thus, China’s trade-to-GDP ratio for 1997 
is 36% or less than 10% depending on which figures you use. The true size 
of the Chinese economy lies somewhere between Chinese and PPP 
calculations, but we can suggest with some confidence that trade is a less 
important element of the Chinese economy than initial figures seem to 
suggest. 
 
Second, there is the question of calculating Chinese trade statistics. The 
trade data used in this paper primarily originate from the PRC General 
Administration of Customs. If anything, these figures understate the growth 
of exports (and therefore total trade and China’s trade surplus) because of 
the difference between Chinese and Western methods of calculating exports. 
For example, according to US official estimates, the US-China trade 
imbalance in 1998 was around $57 billion, while Chinese official data 
showed an imbalance of `only’ $21 billion.5 
 
Part of the problem results from the fact that China calculates the value of 
exports as they leave China’s shores (FOB calculations), while the USA 
and most other states calculate the value of those goods as they arrive in 
their country (FAB calculations).6 However, a further and greater 
complication arises from the question of how to calculate bilateral trade that 
passes through a third place -  most obviously Hong Kong. For example, 
China calculates that 60% of exports to the USA pass through a third place 
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en route- primarily Hong Kong.7 According to Chinese statistics, on 
average, once the good leaves China, there is an extra 40.7% value-added in 
the third place, and in the case of toys and textiles, the subsequent value 
added even exceeds 100%. As US statistics count exports through Hong 
Kong as Chinese exports, the Chinese argument is that this misses the huge 
value added that occurs once the goods leave China. 
 
Feng and Liu have recalculated Sino-American trade taking into account 
the difference between FOB and FAB prices, re-exports through 
Hong Kong, and smuggling.8 They conclude that the Sino-US 
trade imbalance in 1998 was around $35 billion—almost (but not 
quite) half-way between the Chinese and American figures. These 
discrepancies are not just a matter of statistical interest. As Chinese 
exports have boomed, so trade friction has increased between 
China and the USA in particular, and the West in general. And the 
size and importance (or otherwise) of China’s trade surplus with the 
West varies depending on which figures you use. Thus, the 
Chinese authorities are accused by the West of deliberately 
deflating the importance of Chinese trade, while the Chinese 
accuse the West of unfairly exaggerating the significance of 
Chinese exports. Or as the then Minister of Foreign Economics and 
Trade, Li Lanqing, put it when Western governments questioned 
Chinese trade figures in 1992, “We are of the view that these trade 
imbalances [are] caused mainly by unreasonable methods of keeping 
international trade statistics.”9
 
Statistical survey 
Table 1 shows the growth in Chinese trade from the start of the 
reform period until 1996. Although Chinese figures deflate the value of 
exports, using a common set of statistics means that the growth figures may 
be more reliable than raw trade statistics. As these trade statistics are 
denominated in US dollars, the figures have been adjusted to 
common 1996 US dollars. 
 
While long-term growth rates are clearly significant in themselves, the 
increase in Chinese exports between 1993 and 1995 warrants particular 
attention here. Exports increased by 60% in two years (53% in real terms), 
and doubled between 1993 and 1997.10 In the process, a $12.2 billion trade 
deficit in 1993 was transformed into a $5.4 billion surplus the following 
year, rising to $40.3 billion in 1997. Considering the deflationary impact of 
Chinese export statistics, the increase in exports and the transition from 
trade deficit to surplus may be even more dramatic than these figures 
suggest. 
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There are two main explanations for these changes. The first is the massive 
influx of FDI into China in 1993, an issue we will return to below. Second, 
and more important, was the `restructuring’ of China’s foreign exchange 
rate system in 1994. The Chinese currency, the Renminbi (RMB) Yuan, is 
not fully convertible on international markets, and exchange rates remain 
under central government management and control. However, in the early 
1990s a market rate of sorts appeared as the government relaxed regulations 
on currency exchanges. To facilitate increased international economic 
contacts, a number of `swap shops’ were established,11 where individuals 
could `swap’ the Yuan for foreign currency.12 Although the official 
exchange rate at the time was RMB5.7 to the dollar, the swap shop rate was 
influenced by supply and demand, and was closer to RMB9 to the dollar. 
 
Faced with this disparity, and a record trade deficit in 1993, the government 
`unified’ the two rates in 1994. This essentially entailed moving to the swap 
shop rate, with the new exchange rate of RMB8.7 to the dollar apparently 
representing a 50% devaluation. In reality, most companies did not obtain 
all of their foreign currency at the managed exchange rate, and were already 
using the market rate for a proportion of their foreign exchange dealings. 
As such, the headline 50% devaluation was probably nearer 20–30% for 
most exporters. Nevertheless, this move increased the relative 
competitiveness of Chinese export  - notably relative to the cost of exports 
from other states in Southeast Asia following export lead growth strategies. 
 
Competitive export led growth and the Asian financial crises 
China’s own strategy was in part inspired by the success of export-led 
strategies elsewhere in Asia in spurring economic growth. But while 
difficult to quantify, China’s decision to pursue a similar strategy helped to 
undermine the effectiveness of the strategy in other states. Indeed, the 
financial crises in Southeast Asia in some respects represented belated and 
drastic currency realignments in response to China’s 1994 devaluation. 
 
This is not to say that trade relationships in Asia represent a zero-sum game. 
However, it is the case that, when China re-entered the global economy, it 
began to compete with other export-orientated states for foreign investment, 
and competed with these states for access to the key lucrative markets of 
the USA, Japan and the EU. Table 2 shows the growth in trade with China’s 
major partners from the start of the reform process in 1978 to 1996, while 
Table 3 shows the changing distribution of trade with those partners over 
the same period. 
 
The directions of trade statistics are somewhat skewed by the special role of 
Hong Kong in Chinese trade. Before the start of the reform 
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process in 1978, Hong Kong provided China’s main link with 
the global economy, acting as a transit point for exports and 
imports with the capitalist world. Despite growing bilateral 
economic relations with other countries, China’s special 
relationship with Hong Kong has remained intact, with trade 
between China and Hong Kong now the world’s third biggest 
bilateral trade relationship (behind US–Canadian and US–Japanese 
trade).13 Indeed, the percentage of Chinese exports to Hong Kong which are 
subsequently re-exported to other destinations increased from around 30% 
in 1979 to over 85% in 1994.14 
 
If we factor in exports to Hong Kong that are re-exported to a third country, 
then the importance of the USA and Japan in particular as markets 
for Chinese exports increases. As Table 4 shows, with the 
addition of the EU, these three major markets take around two-
thirds of all Chinese exports. The Japanese and US markets were 
also the primary destination for exports of finished goods from 
other export-orientated states in Asia. And as Table 5 shows, 
there appears to be a correlation between the rise of exports from 
China to the USA and Japan, and a decline in exports from Asian crisis states to 
the same markets. 
 
These figures, produced by the Japan External Trade Organisation, question 
how much room is there in the `market place’ for so many countries 
searching for the same FDI to produce the same goods for export to the 
same markets. The potential problem for late developing states emphasising 
low costs as a means of attracting investment to spur export-led growth is 
that an even later developer with even lower costs might erode their 
comparative advantage. 
 
Chinese export growth - who benefits? 
On the face of it, then, if the Chinese experience questions the 
wisdom of export-led growth, it is other export-orientated states that have 
been faced with problems rather than China itself. However, if we 
go beyond a simple analysis of trade figures, and ask who 
benefits from China’s export growth, we identify a number of 
important political economy issues. In essence, we need to move 
away from a statist approach - asking if China has benefited - 
towards a disaggregated approach asking who has benefited from 
the growth in Chinese trade? 
 
Uneven development 
First, we have to recognise that uneven development has been a key 
characteristic of the Chinese reform process. As Table 6 shows, Chinese 
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export industries are concentrated in nine coastal provinces with 
Guangdong Province providing some 41% of all exports. Indeed, 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) alone accounts for around 
14% of all Chinese exports.15 
 
Table 6 also includes information on the provincial distribution of 
FDI. The distribution for 1997 is in some ways unrepresentative of FDI 
flows since the start of the reform process. Guangdong’s share of 
FDI in 1997 is low by historical comparison. In aggregate terms, 
Guangdong has attracted around 40% of all FDI into China since 
1978. However, while Guangdong’s share has fallen, the 
distribution has been within the coastal region, rather than from 
coast to interior. 
 
FDI figures are provided here because of the crucial role that foreign invest-
ment has played in the growth of Chinese exports. Indeed, to understand the 
politics of export growth, it is essential to distinguish between 
`domestic’ Chinese exports, and foreign-funded Chinese exports. 
 
`Domestic’ Chinese exports and protectionism 
Chinese state actors at both national and local levels have taken a proactive 
role in promoting export industries. In addition to the competitive 
currency devaluation of 1994 noted above, national and local 
authorities have introduced a number of measures to support 
exporters, particularly in the state-owned sector. For example, they 
have eased access to investment capital by providing loans 
through the creation of specialist banks, and provided a number of 
tax exemptions and other incentives for exporters. 
 
Furthermore, US trade officials claim that the lack of full price 
reform in China also acts as a hidden state subsidy for those Chinese 
producers in the state sector, and even private enterprises that retain 
close and warm links with the state administration.16 The price of land, 
labour and key industrial inputs such as energy and steel are not solely 
or in some cases primarily set by market forces. While market 
forces are an increasingly important force in the Chinese economy, 
the state retains the authority to set prices and allocate 
resources of key productive forces. As these state-set prices are 
much lower than the prevailing market price, the retention of state 
control entails a hidden subsidy to favoured producers. 
 
This state support for exporters is accompanied by significant protection for 
domestic producers from the impact of participating in the 
 8 
global economy. Access to the Chinese market remains restricted. 
China operates a system of mandatory import plans, and restricts 
licenses for imports of key commodities. The biggest restrictions here 
are on iron and steel, textile yarns and machinery - the critical sectors 
where inefficient domestic producers in the state sector are most 
vulnerable to international competition, and the sectors where exports from 
the state sector are strongest. 
 
Chinese import tariffs remain among the highest in the world. Average 
tariff rates have been falling in response to international 
pressure. From a high point of 43% in 1992, they have been 
progressively lowered to around 17%, with a promise for further 
reductions to follow. However, foreign exporters argue that the 
real tariff rate is nearer 40%, as value added tax is always added to 
imports, while domestic producers are typically granted exemptions 
by local authorities. 
 
Those foreign companies that try and gain access to the Chinese market by 
locating their operations in China also face discrimination, and find 
themselves subject to different charges and rules of the game than domestic 
producers in the same sector. For example, while Chinese producers, 
particularly in the state sector, will benefit from cheaper state set prices for 
key inputs, foreign companies usually have to pay the higher market rate 
for the same commodities. Chinese enterprises are also supported through 
massive subsidies, which often take the form of `loans’ from government or 
the banking system that will never be repaid. For example, the World Bank 
calculates that such non-performing loans account for 20% of the assets of 
Chinese banks,17 and the Chinese State Statistical Bureau announced that 
unpaid loans to various levels of government accounted for 10% of Chinese 
GNP in 1995.18 Furthermore, incomplete currency convertibility restricts 
access to foreign currency to either the chosen few, or those operating 
within the designated production zones; it also means that converting and 
repatriating profits is difficult if not impossible. 
 
Finally, there are two other issues that have brought international criticism 
of China’s trade regime. The first is the wide-scale infringement of 
intellectual and property rights in China, where the production of 
counterfeit and fake products is commonplace. The second is the 
lack of transparency in China’s policy-making process. The state 
news agency, Xinhua, has an official monopoly in the 
dissemination of economic information, and ensures that this 
information serves the interests of the Chinese state, rather than the 
interests of the international community. 
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The international community has attempted to pressure China to 
liberalise its trade regime in a number of ways. The EU, for example, has 
refused to classify China as a `Market Economy’. As a result, the 
EU estimates the fair price for Chinese exports by comparing 
them with the price of goods from the most comparable market 
economy, in this case India. If the cost of Chinese goods is found to be 
unfairly low, then the exports are subject to the imposition of extra 
import duties to protect European producers under EU anti-
dumping legislation.19 While the strict `non-market’ classification 
was dropped in December 1997, the EU reserves the right to judge 
Chinese exports on a sector by sector basis, and will continue to 
impose anti-dumping duties on goods from those sectors of the 
Chinese economy that remain subsidised by the state.20 
 
While the EUs stance has irked Chinese policy makers, US 
policy towards China has been the main focus of Chinese attention and 
resistance. Sino-US economic relations have been punctuated by 
threats of trade wars, such as the threat to impose a $2 billion tariff 
on Chinese textiles, electronics and consumer goods if Beijing did 
not take more forceful measures to deal with piracy of 
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, the annual vote in 
Washington over whether to facilitate Chinese access to the US 
market by renewing China’s Most Favoured Nation trade 
preferences has generated considerable unease in Beijing.21 
 
Re-exports and the processing trade 
Foreign enterprises operating in China have taken an increasingly important 
role in promoting the growth of Chinese exports. The relationship 
between increased FDI flows and trade can be divided into two 
main sub-groups. The first is the increase in trade from those 
companies which primarily invest in China to access the huge 
potential domestic market. In establishing operations in China, 
the investors often bring with them equipment for their new factories. 
Indeed, the desire to encourage such technology imports was one of the 
main reasons that the Chinese authorities encouraged such 
investment in the first place, and investors have been granted 
tax exemptions on high-tech imports that the Chinese authorities 
feel will strengthen the technological base of the Chinese economy. 
 
In addition to technology imports, this type of market-based investment has 
also generated increased exports from China. By restricting licenses to 
produce in China, the Chinese authorities have a firm bargaining position 
with potential investors. They have control over something that the 
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investors want (ie access to the Chinese market) and can play off rival 
bidders against each other. Perhaps the best example of this process is 
the way in which the Chinese authorities restricted access to the potentially 
enormous Chinese automobile market, and then gained huge concessions 
from General Motors by continually keeping counter-offers from Ford on 
the table. 
 
Thus many investors have been forced to sign agreements to 
export a proportion of whatever they produce in China. While the 
proportion of exports is typically less than half of total production, it 
can be much higher—Sony, for example, signed an agreement to 
export 70% of their production in China. As a result, China 
earns foreign currency, and the `Made in China’ hallmark 
becomes associated with high quality goods and respected brand 
names. 
 
While market-based investment has increased China’s foreign 
trade profile— both in terms of the volume and quality of traded goods—
the implications of the growth of `export-based investment’ has been 
even more significant, and has had a profound impact on both the 
growth and structure of Chinese trade. While the Chinese authorities 
may have hoped that FDI would help reinvigorate the domestic 
Chinese economy by using domestically produced components, 
investors have frequently complained about the poor quality and 
unreliability of Chinese supplies. Thus, the majority of these 
investors choose to import key components from existing plants 
overseas, with the Chinese sites typically only concentrating on labour-
intensive component assembly. 
 
Thus export-based investment in China has resulted in a 
significant growth of both imports (in the form of components) and 
exports (of finished goods). From being an almost insignificant element of 
Chinese trade in the 1980s, it accounted for around half of all trade in 
1997.22 This transition is reflected in the structure of Chinese trade. The 
majority of investors source their components from other production sites in 
Asia and sell their finished goods in the developed markets of the West. 
This has contributed to the situation where China now runs a massive trade 
surplus with the primary destination for processed exports, the USA, and 
trade deficits with those Asian states that are the source of component 
imports (notably South Korea and Taiwan). 
 
The two exceptions in Asia are Japan and Hong Kong. There is 
evidence to suggest that Japanese companies are increasingly optimistic 
about the development of China as a major market for Chinese goods.23 
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However, the FDI-trade linkage remains a crucial determinant of 
Sino-Japanese trade. If Hong Kong subsidiaries of companies from 
other third states are taken out of the equation, then Japan is the biggest 
source of FDI in China. Note that imports from Japan increased by 70% in 
1993 (66% in real terms)—the year that FDI into China also boomed. In 
addition, Japanese companies often prefer to invest in China through 
subsidiaries in other East Asian states,24 while many independently owned 
Korean, Taiwanese and Hong Kong investors use high tech Japanese 
components in their Chinese operations. As such, simple bilateral trade 
figures understate the importance of Japanese goods in the development of 
China’s processing trade. 
 
As the most developed state in Asia, Japan is not only the major 
source of outward investment, but also the most lucrative market for 
finished goods in the region. Indeed, over a quarter of Japanese imports 
are goods produced by Japanese plants overseas,25 and much of Japan’s 
trade with China is effectively inter-company trade between different 
branches of Japanese multinational corporations, or `reverse imports’ of 
goods made by other Asian investors in China containing Japanese 
components. 
 
The trade surplus with Hong Kong is explained by the subsequent re-export 
of goods to the West. For example, the proportion of Chinese 
exports to Hong Kong that are re-exported to the USA increased from 
4.86% in 1979 to 41.6% in 1994. In addition, just over half of all 
Hong Kong exports to China in 1994 were goods of US origin.26 
 
The processing trade raises questions over the how we classify the 
`nationality’ of exports. If components are simply being 
assembled in China, are the resulting goods really Chinese? Jin 
Bei, from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that 
we should distinguish between those exports that are produced by 
`the national industry’ and those that are `non-domestically manu-
factured goods’. To count as real Chinese exports, the goods must 
be produced by Chinese enterprises or by companies where 
Chinese interests control share ownership. They should be 
produced with equipment and technology operated by Chinese 
technicians and with a `certain figure’ of Chinese components. 
Finally, for Jin Bei, brand-naming is the key to identifying the 
real `country of origin’. It `serves as an important indicator of the 
ªnationalityº of a product’, and Chinese exports therefore should be 
labelled with Chinese trademarks. Those goods that meet most, 
but not all, of these requirements, should be called `para-
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domestically manufactured goods.’ 
 
Jin Bei argues that those products exported from China carrying foreign 
brand names produced with foreign materials and/or controlled by 
foreign managers and/or technicians simply should not be 
considered as made in China. He illustrates his argument with a case 
study of Pierre Cardin shirts produced at the Beijing Shirt Factory. 
These shirts retailed (at the time) at the equivalent of RMB300 
in the West,  yet  the Beij ing shirt  factory only received RMB3 
to RMB4 for each unit in processing fees: 
Such goods do not primarily involve the actualization of China’s 
productive forces, but the actualization of foreign 
productive forces in China, or the economic actualization 
achieved by turning Chinese resources into productive 
forces subject to the control of foreign capital owners.27 
 
A more often cited example is the case of Barbie dolls. The case 
study was first reported in the USA itself in a Los Angeles Times report in 
1996.28 The fact that the issue was raised in an American source has 
been seized on by the Chinese authorities, who cited the paper 
liberally in its White Paper `On Sino-US Trade Balance’ in 1997.29 
 
Barbie dolls retailed in the USA at the time at around $10 each, even 
though the unit import of each doll was a mere $2. Although trade figures 
show a $2 import from China, it is argued that this was an unfair 
representation of the real value of these exports to China. The raw materials 
for the plastics were imported into Taiwan from the Middle East, and the 
hair similarly exported to Taiwan from Japan. The goods were semi-
finished in Taiwan, and only then exported to China for the final stages 
of production. The real value to the Chinese economy was a mere 35 cents, 
with the remainder of the $2 either already accounted for before the doll 
reaches China (65 cents) or in the cost of transportation from Hong Kong to 
the US ($1). 
 
The suggestion in this report was that the USA should not calculate China’s 
trade surplus based on the value of the good that leaves China. Rather it 
should factor in the value of the good as it is imported into China, and 
consider the other elements to be part of its trade relationship with Taiwan, 
Japan and the Middle East. In other words, it is unfair, not to say wrong, to 
simply count the last country in a production chain as the country that you 
have a trade relationship with for that commodity. In particular, the diffused 
nature of production means that the final stage in the production chain is 
usually labour- intensive component assembly and/or finishing semi-
finished produce—in other words, areas with low value added. 
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Indeed, in his assessment of China’s role in the global economy, Lardy 
calculated that imported components typically account for 90% of the value 
of exports from foreign enterprises operating in China.30 As the processing 
trade now accounts for around half of all Chinese trade, the implication is 
that around half of the value of Chinese exports is in fact the value of goods 
imported from other states. 
 
What the report on Barbie dolls didn’t go on to mention is that Barbie is 
produced by the Mattel Company which has its headquarters in El Segundo 
in California. Mattel (which also produces Fisher Price, Matchbox, 
Cabbage-patch dolls, Disney, Pooh, Sesame Street, Nickelodeon and others) 
is only one of a number of US-based toy companies that have at least part 
of their production process located in China. It was the US toy industry that 
took the lead in trying to instigate a consumer boycott of cheap Chinese 
imports in the USA. Yet these US-based corporations are now making use 
of cheap labour in China to boost corporate profits. 
 
It should be noted that it is not always easy to identify the extent of the 
involvement of US and other Western firms in the Chinese 
economy. As noted above, components are often routed through 
Hong Kong and/or Taiwan, or are produced by subcontractors in 
other parts of Asia. In addition, FDI is also often `routed’ through 
subcontractors in Asia. For example, the biggest shoe factory in the world 
is in Guangdong Province. This factory is a joint venture with Yu 
Yuan in Taiwan, and produces sports shoes carrying Reebok, Nike 
and Adidas labels.31 FDI and import statistics indicate the 
importance of relations with the rest of Asia and export figures 
show another Chinese export to Japan and the West—yet the brand 
names on the goods are associated with major Western 
corporations. 
 
All this does not suggest that China has not benefited from the export of 
assembled goods. This has created jobs—although typically low wage and 
low skilled jobs—and generated income. But it does suggest that China has 
not gained as much as simply looking at bilateral figures for export growth 
initially suggests. Rather, we need to take a more holistic view of trade 
figures and consider the value added, rather than the nominal value, of 
exports. Indeed, perhaps we need to ignore nationally based statistics 
altogether, and consider inter and intra-company trade instead of national 
trade. 
 
Thus, if we ask who benefits, we can identify Chinese partners in joint 
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ventures. If we think that low paid, low skilled jobs in poor conditions are 
better than no job at all, then the workers in these enterprises can also be 
said to benefit. But we should not forget that major Western corporations 
are also benefiting greatly—and perhaps most—from this element at least 
of China’s export growth. 
 
Export-led development and the impact of the Asian financial crises 
The Chinese were, of course, far from alone in failing to foresee the 
economic crises that hit many regional states in 1997. Had they been 
blessed with such foresight, they might not have chosen the same year to try 
and restructure their own domestic economy and place an even greater 
reliance on export-led growth. And notwithstanding the fact that China 
escaped the worst ravages of the regional crises in 1997, the crises have 
nevertheless had an important impact on the long-term viability of export-
led growth. 
 
On a very basic level, regional financial problems have simply undermined 
confidence, and turned the positive examples of other export-orientated 
regional states into negative examples of the dangers of liberalising too 
fully and too quickly. China shares many of the structural weaknesses that 
contributed to the crises in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. It too has 
massive bank debts caused largely by the provision of non-performing 
loans to the state sector. It has invested millions of dollars in construction 
projects that people don’t want.32 It also has an economy characterised by 
both oversupply and under-capacity. For example, in 1996 half of China’s 
industry operated at below 60% capacity, while the official Jingji Ribao 
(Economics Daily) indicated that stockpiles of goods that couldn’t be sold 
exceeded RMB500 billion.33
 
The main reason why China didn’t suffer the same fate as its regional 
neighbours was its relative lack of liberalisation and openness compared 
with other regional states. With a managed exchange rate underpinned by 
strict limitations and controls on currency convertibility, the renminbi was 
safe from attack by international speculators. 
 
In addition, the `hot money’ that foreign investors had ploughed into capital 
markets in Southeast Asia could be, and was, rapidly removed. In China, 
the underdeveloped nature of Chinese stock and capital markets—perhaps 
we should say the immature and underdeveloped nature of Chinese 
capitalism—had also resulted in a different structure of foreign capital 
flows into China. The vast majority—indeed, almost all foreign capital 
inflows into China—were in longterm investment projects; foreign currency 
had built many more factories than it had purchased share certificates. 
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In the aftermath of the crises, China’s export-led growth strategy began to 
encounter new challenges. On one level, the problems in Japan, the region’s 
most developed state, raised the prospect of a shrinking market for Chinese 
exports. On another level, the collapse of currencies in Southeast Asia 
meant that China lost its competitive advantage in export prices that it had 
gained from its own strategic and managed devaluation in 1994. 
 
As China’s relative lack of liberalisation had provided protection from the 
regional economic crises, the case for abandoning such protection and 
moving towards a more liberalised economy lost much of its force. It also 
provided those sceptics within the party the ammunition that they needed to 
call for a re-think and a postponement, if not abandonment, of liberalisation 
reforms. 
 
The Chinese leadership’s response to the regional crises illuminates their 
perceptions of the importance of export growth. The Chinese economy has 
continued to register the sort of growth rates that would delight many 
governments—but not the Chinese government. For example, when exports 
grew by 11.6% in the first four months of 1997, the government organised a 
televised national conference to announce the news. Rather than 
congratulate themselves on achieving such high growth, the party 
leadership instead used the conference to warn of an uncertain future. 
Exports were still growing, but the rate of growth had slowed. Similarly, 
while foreign investment had actually increased, the rate of increase had 
also slowed considerably. 
 
When she addressed the conference and a national audience, State 
Councillor Wu Yi argued that the impact of the financial crises `cannot be 
overestimated’. She argued that export growth should not be seen as a 
purely economic question, but also as a key political issue, as `proper 
export growth is critical in helping the nation reform State-owned 
enterprises, create jobs and promote social stability’. If export growth did 
not increase, then `our course of opening up might also be affected’.34
 
At first sight, Wu Yi’s comments appear to be disproportional to the 
problem. The explanation lies in a combination of the importance of job 
creation as a mechanism of ensuring social stability, and the relationship 
between export growth and the state of the domestic Chinese economy. 
 
Export growth, employment and social stability 
It is difficult to overestimate how seriously the Chinese government takes 
the threat to social instability from any increase in urban unemployment. 
Sporadic and uncoordinated cases of social disorder increased in 1998 and 
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1999 largely in response to proposed closures and mergers of enterprises, 
unpaid welfare payments to laid-off workers, unpaid pensions from closed 
or loss-making enterprises, and to protest against official corruption.35
 
The government is officially committed to keeping urban unemployment 
below 4%. In reality, Chinese researchers claim the urban unemployment 
rate is probably already nearer 8%, as workers can be `laid off’ from their 
jobs for up to three years before they are officially classified as 
`unemployed’. Furthermore, a national figure of less than 4% hides 
significant regional variations. While coastal regions that have attracted 
FDI have been able to create new jobs for both local workers and migrants 
from other parts of China, the unemployment problem is more acute in 
North East China and central provinces such as Hunan. 
 
There are a number of explanations for the growth of unemployment - 
explanations that have been well rehearsed in a number of publications by 
Hu Angang from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.36 These include 
demographic pressures that result in 10 million new entrants into the job 
market each year; technological advances; the steady flow of migrant 
workers from the countryside to the cities; and massive duplication of 
production that has turned the Chinese economy from one characterised by 
shortage in the 1970s to one characterised by oversupply in the 1990s. 
 
While the structural causes of unemployment are deep seated and long term, 
two elements of the economic reforms associated with Zhu Rongji in the 
second half of the 1990s accelerated unemployment growth. First, Zhu 
reconfirmed his commitment to restructuring loss-making state-owned 
enterprises in 1997. In addition to resulting in around 10 million laid-off 
workers in two years, fears of potential job losses also dampened domestic 
demand. This leads us to the second factor. From 1994 Zhu Rongji 
instituted a deflationary strategy. This programme was highly successful in 
its own terms. The retail price index dropped from over 20% in 1994 to - 
2.6% in 1998, while real GDP growth only fell from 12.6% to 7.8% (see 
Table 7). 
 
This growth rate was by and large attained by an ever increasing reliance on 
exports as an engine for growth. Rather than being an important component 
in growth, exports all but became the sole generator of growth, and the 
safety net for domestic restructuring. They were a means of maintaining 
employment, creating new jobs, and essentially providing the opportunity 
to deal with the domestic economy while not sacrificing growth or 
dramatically increasing urban unemployment. Hence Wu Yi’s concern that 
an 11.6% increase in exports might not be enough to allow the reforms to 
continue successfully. 
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In the event, export growth remained strong in 1997, registering a 17.3% 
increase in real terms over 1996. However, the impact of the Asian 
financial crises was merely delayed, and export growth in 1998 was a mere 
0.5%. Indeed, if we denominate the figures in common US dollars, there 
was a decline in real terms of around 1%. Domestic deflation in China 
resulted in a decline in imports in both 1997 and 1998, meaning that 
China’s overall trade surplus continued to grow while export growth 
declined. 
 
There are two main explanations for this decline in export growth. First, the 
reduction of demand from the crisis states. The collapse in the demand for 
exports in South East Asia hit specific industries - notably construction 
materials. More importantly, exports to Korea, China’s second biggest 
export market in Asia, fell by almost a third. More important still was the 
decline in demand from Japan, with exports falling by 11.5% in 1998. 
 
In the Korean and Japanese cases, declining domestic demand was 
exacerbated by increased price competition following the devaluation of 
regional currencies. The crises meant that China lost its competitive 
advantage in export prices that it had gained from its own strategic and 
managed devaluation in 1994. Exports from Malaysia and Indonesia were 
between 15% and 40% cheaper during 1998 than before the crash, while the 
Thai baht was 36% lower against the Yuan than before the Chinese 
devaluation. 
 
The decline in exports to the rest of Asia accounted for virtually all the 
overall drop in export growth. Indeed, exports to Europe and the USA grew 
by 15.3% and 16.1% respectively. Given China’s ongoing trade disputes 
with the USA, and China’s WTO entry ambitions, a combination of a 
decline in overall exports with an increase in both exports and trade surplus 
with the USA creates a potent set of challenges. 
 
Not only is there a disparity between export growth to different markets, 
there is a disparity between export performance by different sectors of the 
Chinese economy. While exports by State Owned Enterprises declined by 
5.8%, exports from foreign invested enterprises increased by 8%—indeed, 
exports by wholly foreign owned enterprises increased by 17.3%.37 It is 
particularly notable, and pertinent to the arguments in this article, that 
exports utilising imported components produced by foreign invested firms 
increased by 17.3%.38
 
It is clear that price competition from the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) states has damaged the export capability of `domestic’ 
exporters. But the situation in the processing trade is less clear. With so 
much of the value of these exports emanating from imported components, 
often from the rest of Asia, currency devaluations have decreased the unit 
costs of production. The key to maintaining China’s comparative advantage 
in the processing trade is the retention of low labour costs combined with 
various incentives provided to attract FDI. 
 
Conclusions: the wrong type of exports? 
In many ways the Chinese experience of reintegration with the global 
economy provides a positive example for other developing states of how to 
manage international economic contacts. In particular, the maintenance of a 
relatively closed financial system provided a bulwark against speculative 
capital flows. 
 
In foreign trade too, China’s relative lack of openness has allowed the 
government to defend perceived national interests by protecting domestic 
producers and supporting exporters. But in the process, the notion of a 
`national’ interest has been brought ever more into doubt. The protection 
afforded to domestic producers, particularly state-owned enterprises, has 
protected employment and provided a safety net for urban workers during 
the transition from socialism. However, it has also contributed to the 
creation of a dualistic economy—one part reliant on the retention of at least 
an element of state control and protection, the other market and 
internationally orientated and, at the very least, less hostile to the further 
liberalisation of the Chinese economy. 
 
Writing on a much earlier period of reform, Solinger argued that “The most 
obvious bases determining which point of view a particular group or 
institution is prone to support are the province in which it is located and the 
branch of industry with which it is connected.”39 This analysis by and large 
still holds true in response to calls for further liberalisation and opening to 
the global economy. Officials from those areas where state-owned 
enterprises still dominate the economy have been the most vocal in calling 
for restraint, and in criticising Premier Zhu Rongji for being over-zealous in 
attacking inflation and too eager to promote a liberalisation agenda. For 
these sceptics or conservers, the logic of devaluing the renminbi to restore 
the price competitiveness of exports and increase the price of competitive 
imports is convincing. 
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It was in many ways simply unfortunate that the Asian financial crises 
began to undermine Chinese export growth at a time when such export 
growth had become an increasingly important guarantor of growth. But the 
decision to use export growth as a means of maintaining employment while 
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deflating the domestic economy made Chinese development strategies 
vulnerable to changes in the regional and global political economy. The 
lesson of the Chinese experience, and indeed also of the crisis states, is that 
an over-reliance on external markets relative to the domestic market entails 
a degree of risk that can affect even a relatively closed economy such as 
China. This is a lesson that the Chinese leadership themselves have learnt, 
moving from a deflationary strategy to a form of Chinese Keynsian 
expansion in an attempt to spend their way out of a potential crisis. 
 
Finally, we need to question whether the growth of the processing trade 
provides a firm foundation for long term sustainable growth in China. The 
short-term requirements of job creation have been largely served—and the 
personal fortunes of those domestic interests that collaborate with external 
interests in establishing processing industries in China have been ensured. 
But the emphasis on China’s low cost comparative advantage in labour-
intensive processing industries is doing little more than merely providing 
jobs—often jobs with low wages in poor conditions—for the short term. 
 
The challenge is to move on from low value added assembly to new forms 
of production with greater value added that also develop China’s skill and 
technology base. And to this end the Chinese authorities moved to restrict 
imports of cheap components in June 1999. This move was partly aimed at 
reducing imports from other Asian states that were damaging the position 
of vulnerable domestic producers. But according to Minister of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, Shi Guangsheng, the Chinese authorities 
were also `trying to encourage the processing sector to move toward a hi-
tech and high value-added orientation’ .40
 
The problem is that neither the Chinese national government nor those 
more directly involved in the processing sector have autonomy in deciding 
how to participate in the international economy. In their analysis of 
Taiwanese investment in the Xiamen SEZ, Qi Lou and Howe show how the 
Xiamen authorities originally concentrated on attracting electronics 
manufacturers, and designed their local development strategy accordingly. 
However, Taiwanese investors had different priorities, and instead brought 
in more and more chemicals producers; `faced with this divergence, the 
Xiamen authorities apparently abandoned their original goal and declared 
petrochemicals to be their new “investment emphasis”’.41 A similar process 
occurred in Shenzhen where the local leadership tried to restructure the 
local economy by imposing disincentives for processing industries and 
component assembly. While these industries did indeed decline, the high-
tech and financial investments that Shenzhen was hoping to attract were not 
forthcoming. As a result, the local authority reversed its policy, and 
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reintroduced a number of incentives to lure back the processing and 
component assembly investments.42 And when the government in Beijing 
removed tax exemptions on imported goods used in foreign funded 
enterprises in 1996, FDI declined to such an extent that the government 
back-tracked and reintroduced tax exemptions on such imports from 1 
January 1998. 
 
Having located China as a low cost assembly site in an international 
division of labour, it is proving difficult to progress to a new stage. Given 
the perceived importance of employment as a guarantor of social stability 
for the Chinese elites, the chance that China will compete in a crowded 
international market43 by keeping production costs low is more likely than 
the transition to hi-tech production that the Chinese leadership favours. 
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